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Abstract This article discusses the tools applied by Polish courts to achieve the ef-
fective and uniform application of European Union law. It cites and analyses relevant
case law of the Polish Supreme Court assuring the supremacy and direct effect of
European Union law, for example, European Union directives on consumer law.
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More than six years of Polish membership of the European Union have now passed
since 1 May 2004, which gives the opportunity to make some observations on the
use by the Polish Supreme Court of tools for an effective and uniform application of
European Union law.
The Supreme Court participates—as a European Union court—in the fulfillment
by Poland of its duty to take appropriate measures, general or particular, to ensure
fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of
the institutions of the Union, an obligation now provided for by Article 4 paragraph 3
of the Treaty on European Union).
The Polish courts are fully conscious of their obligation to guarantee the full ef-
fectiveness of European Union law and the necessity to refuse to apply provisions of
national law which are contrary to European Union law, without the necessity to wait
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for a formal removal of them from the legal system. Nevertheless, only a few Pol-
ish Supreme Court judgments have concerned the principles of supremacy and direct
effect.
They show however that the Supreme Court has extensively considered the scope
of the supremacy principle. The Court has applied it in the context both of primary
and of secondary European Union law. It has given direct effect to Article 28 of the
EC Treaty (now Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union)
prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports and measures having equivalent ef-
fect. Insofar as concerns secondary law, the Court has given direct effect to measures
in regulations and directives alike. The Court has held contracts granting the Pol-
ish fish processing industry with compensation for temporary cessation of activities
in order to protect aquatic resources contrary to a 1999 Council Regulation laying
down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance
in the fisheries sector.1 Several provisions of directives have been given direct effect
in labour law cases. In one of them the Court held that a then-European Community
rule prohibiting sex discrimination, then given expression by Article 4 of the 1978
Council Directive on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treat-
ment for men and women in matters of social securities, could be applied directly and
required the same right to an early retirement pension for orchestra conductors who
were men as for conductors who are women.2 In another case, concerning medical
duties, the Supreme Court held that the computation of employee working time has
to be done with regard to the 1993 Council Directive concerning certain aspects of
the organization of working time.3 This decision resulted in the possibility of deriv-
ing employee rights against public employers directly from the directive. The Polish
courts are however required to have regard to the point that the direct effect relates
only to provisions which are clear, precise, unconditional and confer rights on indi-
viduals.
The case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union shows that the effi-
ciency principle affects national laws further than is justified by its objectives and
function. As a result, this principle gradually “overwrites” the supremacy princi-
ple in some fields. Supremacy still plays a crucial role in resolving conflicts be-
tween national law and European Union law, whereas the efficiency principle is a
mechanism—a tool—rendering possible the controlling of the conformity of national
law with European Union law. The refusal to apply a national rule inconsistent with
European Union law may be unsatisfactory for a person seeking protection of his or
her right rooted in European Union law.
The efficiency principle is not superior to supremacy in general (a priori), however
a court may apply the efficiency principle instead of the supremacy principle when
this is justified by the circumstances of a given case. The efficiency principle includes,
to a certain extent, the supremacy principle. However it is impossible to conclude in
abstracto which one of them is superior—in one case the efficiency principle may
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A national court is obliged to apply both principles: efficiency and supremacy. In
a given case they might be applied at different stages of review. First, the court has to
interpret national law in conformity with a directive regulating the same issue (which
involves the supremacy principle). Secondly, if this is not possible, the court will have
to look for other solutions (tools) to achieve the ends of European Union law (which
involves the efficiency principle).
In the analysed judgment, the Supreme Court did not limit the obligation to in-
terpret national law in the light of a directive’s meaning and objectives in order to
eliminate a conflict between national and European provisions, but rather emphasised
the role of European norms in shaping national laws.
The Supreme Court has quite broad experience in the field of the indirect effect
of European Union law, and thus in ensuring the consistent interpretation of Polish
legal provisions with European Union law, assuming that the limit to this is contra
legem interpretation. Consistent interpretation has been applied by Polish courts to
pre-accession cases too. In most of them the point of reference for the pro-European
interpretation was the content and the aim of European Community directives
(although the duty of consistent interpretation concerns also other European Union
legal acts).
An important group of such cases is composed by cases concerning unfair contract
terms settled in the Polish civil code as a result of the transposition of the Council
Directive of 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.4 Particularly broad reasons
for the necessity of consistent interpretation have been put forward by the Supreme
Court in a resolution of July 13, 2006,5 where it decided that the use of contract terms
similar to those considered forbidden on the basis of a valid judgment by the Court of
Competition and Consumer Protection and entered on the register of such terms can
be considered on the part of another entrepreneur to be a practice violating collective
consumer interests and that such a registration means the prohibition of using this
contract clause by all legal persons, and not merely by the person whose case has
been considered in the judgment which is the basis for the registration. The Court
emphasised that interpretation of the provisions of the Polish law on competition and
consumer protection and of the code of civil procedure had to be carried out in this
case taking into account the content and the aim of the 1988 directive on injunctions
for the protection of consumers’ interests and of the 1993 directive on unfair terms
in consumer contracts. The interpretation had to be consistent with directives even if
the facts of the case occurred before the date of Polish accession. There was only a
different legal basis for such a duty. In the case of facts occurring before this moment,
the obligation of the pro-European interpretation had the nature of an international
law duty and was based on the Europe Agreement of 1991 which established an
association, and which entered into force in 1994. In these cases the Polish courts
had no right to refer questions for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of
Justice. In cases relating to facts which occurred after Polish accession, the obligation
of consistent interpretation was European in nature and had its foundations in what
4I CKN 308/01, IV CSK 200/06.
5III SZP 3/06.
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is now Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union and in the judgments of the
European Court of Justice.
The Supreme Court has taken a similar position in a copyright law case, consid-
ering that the Polish Act on copyright and related rights of 1994, even in its pre-
accession version should respect the content and the aim of the directive of 1993 on
the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright
applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission.6
There is a large number of judgments concerning the consistent interpretation of
the Polish law on industrial property of 2000 with the 1998 directive on approxima-
tion of the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks. The Supreme Court has
extensively cited the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance judgments concern-
ing this directive and the 1993 regulation on the Community trade mark, because a
lot of notions in both acts are similar. As an example, the Supreme Court has used the
consistent interpretation doctrine in two cases defining the repute of a trade mark.7
In several cases the Supreme Court has required the consistent interpretation of
national provisions concerning relations between private individuals in the context of
VAT directives.8
The Supreme Court has refused however to apply consistent interpretation in a
case concerning radio sponsorship considering that the Council directive of 1989
on “television without frontiers” was related only to television and not to radio, so
that there was no basis for its application in the case at issue for the purpose of the
interpretation of the Polish Broadcasting Act.9
The Supreme Court refused to require the consistent interpretation of the provi-
sions of the Polish code of civil procedure on recognition of foreign judgments with
the Treaty norms (viz., Article 61c, Article 65 and Article 293 Indent 4 of the EC
Treaty), because they define only tasks and competences of the Communities in the
scope of the judicial cooperation in civil matters.10
In another case consistent interpretation related to the framework directive of 2002
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and ser-
vices. The Supreme Court had to rule on the possibility of appealing against a deci-
sion of the President of the Office of Telecommunications and Post which confirmed
the absence of an effective competition on one of telecommunication markets. For
this purpose the Supreme Court applied an interpretation consistent with European
law of the Polish telecommunication law and of the code of civil procedure. The
Court considered that although Article 4 of the framework directive was not a di-
rectly effective provision, because it was not unconditional, so that it could not be the
basis for an appeal, Polish provisions should nevertheless be interpreted in a way that
would guarantee the right to appeal expressed by this directive. Any other interpreta-
tion would eliminate the right to access to justice.11
6IV CSK 303/06.
7III CK 160/05, II CSK 428/06.
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In practice the Supreme Court has applied consistent interpretation in some crim-
inal cases.12 The most important tool of judicial cooperation among European Union
member states in criminal matters are framework decisions—which do not have di-
rect effect. However they are applied as a model for consistent interpretation. The
Supreme Court has decided for instance that in surrendering a person requested by
an European Arrest Warrant in order to facilitate the conduct of criminal proceed-
ings against this person on the territory of another European Union member state the
provisions of the issuing state and not of the executing state should be applied and
that they should be interpreted considering the content of the 2002 Council frame-
work decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between
Member States.13
The judgments mentioned above, in particular those applying consistent interpre-
tation, show that the process of the implementation of directives is not perfect, be-
cause many interpretative doubts exist concerning national provisions transposing
directives. The legislative defects of Polish national provisions must be “repaired” by
courts applying—as far as is possible—consistent interpretation. Polish law has been
adapting to compatibility with the European Union law in a rather hurried way and
now Polish courts have to struggle with the results. Since the coming into existence
of the Constitutional Tribunal in 1985 and the entry into force of the new Constitution
of 1997 national judges are quite familiar with the situation of where legal provisions
are under scrutiny from the point of view of conformity with superior normative acts.
They then apply European Union law, especially that they should take into considera-
tion the responsibility provided by the Constitution for any harm done by an action of
an organ of public authority contrary to law, including the incorrect application of the
European Union law in the context of direct and indirect effect (consistent interpre-
tation). The Courts are however rather prudent, because in borderline cases they are
more disposed to apply national provisions and to consider European Union law only
as point of reference for consistent interpretation than to decide in a more categorical
way that European Union law has a direct effect, and in so doing to leave out national
law.
It is also important to notice that the European Union law itself—extremely ex-
tensive, interfering deeply in national law and very dynamic—creates a system very
difficult to effective and uniform application. A good example is European Union
consumer law, which because of its incoherence has had to be consolidated at the Eu-
ropean Union level and it is already implemented in the Member States law systems
and national courts apply it with all the imperfection weight. The challenge for the
national courts is to use European Court of Justice judgments that provide an inter-
pretation of the European Union law, but sometimes it is rather difficult to foresee
it at the moment of the transposition of the European Union provisions—sometimes
very general. Furthermore the overwhelming majority of European Court of Justice
judgments adopted before Polish accession have not yet been translated into Polish.
Therefore the question of the effective and uniform application of European Union
12I KZP 21/06, I KZP 30/08.
13I KZP 21/06.
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law by national courts is often at the same time the question on the quality and cer-
tainty of the European Union law and its cohesion with the national law. The tools of
supremacy, direct effect and consistent interpretation accessible to national judges do
not resolve all the problems generated in the European Union legislative process, by
the creative interpretation of the European Court of Justice and by implementation of
European law norms into national law.
Nevertheless it has to be said that the application by the Polish Supreme Court of
European Union law rarely gives rise to doubts involving the necessity to request a
preliminary ruling under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. Up to now, the Labour Law, Social Security and Public Affairs Chamber of the
Supreme Court has requested the European Court of Justice to make a preliminary
ruling on four occasions.14 It is noticeable that a preliminary ruling is now more
often requested by parties who sometimes provide a large number of arguments for
it. In most cases the Supreme Court does not agree that there are doubts justifying
the question. Although the Court is not bound by the parties’ request, it nevertheless
gives reasons for refusing to refer the question.15
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